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Shareholder wealth effects of European  




In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra)European takeover bids. We find large 
announcement effects of 9% for target firms and a cumulative abnormal return that includes the price run-up over 
the two-month period prior to the announcement date of 23%. However, the share price of the bidding firms reacts 
positively with a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7%. We also show that the status of a 
takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects of target’s and bidder’s shareholders, with hostile 
acquisitions triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly mergers and acquisitions. When a UK 
target or bidder is involved, the abnormal returns are almost twice as high as bids involving both a Continental 
European target and bidder. We also find strong evidence that cash offers trigger much larger share price reactions 
than all-equity offers or combined bids consisting of cash, equity and loan notes. A high market-to-book ratio of 
the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. Also, our 
results suggest that bidding firms should not diversify by acquiring target firms that do not match their core 
business. Surprisingly, domestic bids create larger short-term wealth effects than cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. This results remains valid after controlling for the characteristics of the bid and the target firm. We 
also find that the premiums paid depend on the location of the target. The country dummies we use proxy for 
institutional differences, such as different corporate governance regimes (ownership concentration, takeover 
regulation, protection of shareholder rights, and informational transparency). After controlling for the status of the 
bid (i.e. the higher frequency of hostile acquisitions in the UK), for means of payment, and financial characteristics 
of the target, we find substantially higher wealth effects for UK targets. This is also the case (but to a much smaller 
extent) for German, Austrian and Swiss firms but not for targets in France, the Benelux countries and Southern 
Europe. In addition, we investigate whether the predominant reason for mergers and acquisitions is synergies, 
agency problems or managerial hubris. We find a significant positive correlation between the gains for the target 
shareholder and the total gains from the merger as well as between the gains for the target and those for the bidder. 
This suggests that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders tend to share the 
resulting wealth gains.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It is now well known stylised fact that mergers and acquisitions occur in cyclical waves. The 
second industrial revolution culminated in the first European
1 merger wave (1880-1904) which 
aimed at creating monopolies. Anti-trust regulation curbed monopoly power, but also initiated a 
second merger wave (1919-1929) that led to increased vertical integration. The third European 
merger wave started in the 1950s, but reached its peak only in the mid-1960s. The focus of this 
wave was diversification and the creation of large conglomerates to face the global markets. 
The technological progress in biochemistry and electronics, as well as the development of new 
financial instruments and markets (e.g. the junk bond market), was behind the fourth merger 
wave (1983-1989). These financial innovations facilitated the financing of acquisitions and also 
caused an unprecedented high level of hostile bids. During the past decade, a fifth wave (1993-
2000) emerged coinciding with a sustained economic boom, the development of new European 
stock exchanges (such as the European New Markets and EASDAQ) and the growth in the 
internet- and telecommunications industries. In 2001, the collapse of consumer confidence in 
these industries as well as the overcapacity in the traditional sectors caused an abrupt reduction 
in merger activity. 
 
  The start of the fifth merger and acquisitions wave was clearly 1993 as the total dollar 
value paid for target firms in the US and Europe doubled after 4 consecutive years of decline in 
M&A activity. An even steeper rise happened in 1996: the total value of US and European 
acquisitions rose to USD 1,117 million (with Europe accounting for an 37% of the worldwide 
value of M&A deals). In the following years, the M&A wave gained even more strength with a 
value of USD 1,574 million in 1997 (35% of which was realised in Europe), USD 2,634 million 
in 1998 (33% in Europe), USD 3,319 million in 1999 (47% in Europe), and USD 3,451 million 
in 2000 (43% in Europe). The year 1999 was a remarkable year for the European M&A market, 
as it was now almost as large as the US market. Also, 12% of the total value of the European 
market was now generated by deals in excess of USD 100 billion. The number of hostile 
acquisitions was also exceptionally large in Europe in 1999 with 369 hostile bids to only 14 in 
1996, 7 in 1997, 5 in 1998 and 35 in 2000.
2   
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, Europe includes both Continental Europe and the UK. 
2 As reported in an M&A report by Morgan Stanley based on Thomson Financial Securities Data, April 2001.  Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   3 
   
  A typical phenomenon of the recent M&A wave is that acquisitions are now larger in 
size and tend to be global (Cosh and Hughes, 1996). The value of cross-border acquisitions has 
grown from 0.5% in the mid 1980s to over 2% in 2000. Moreover, cross-border mergers now 
account for more than 80% of all foreign direct investment (FDI) by industrialised countries 
(Conn et al. 2002). Thus, over the past decade, FDI in the US, UK and Continental Europe has 
predominantly occurred through mergers and acquisitions rather than through greenfield 
investments. Harris and Ravencraft (1991) argue that the abnormal returns of targets in 
domestic acquisitions are not expected to differ from those of targets in cross-border 
acquisitions provided that capital and factor markets are not segmented internationally. Still, 
FDI theory posits that such imperfections exist which give multinational firms a competitive 
advantage over local firms. Hence, cross-border acquisitions are expected to generate more 
wealth than domestic acquisitions (Kang 1993). 
 
  In this paper, we aim at investigating the wealth effects of the mergers and 
acquisitions wave of the 1990s. As most of the M&A research concentrates on the US and UK 
markets and most studies also concentrate on M&As in a single country, we believe that a 
European-wide study will yield interesting results. We define Europe in the wide geographical 
sense: it comprises Continental Europe and the UK. We will distinguish between the wealth 
effects of domestic acquisitions and cross-border acquisitions within Europe. Our sample 
consists of all large (intra-)European mergers and acquisitions collected from the Mergers and 
Acquisitions Report and the Financial Times over the period 1993-2000. The paper is organized 
as follows: section 2 summarises the main findings from previous studies on mergers and 
acquisitions. Section 3 describes the data sources, variables and methodology. Section 4 
investigates the short-term wealth effects for target and bidder firms of mergers, and friendly 
and hostile acquisitions. A correlation analysis in section 5 sheds some light on the motives 
behind these mergers and acquisitions. Section 6 then analyses the determinants of the market 
price reactions to M&A announcements and section 7 concludes.  
   
  2. Value drivers of bidder and target abnormal returns. 
 
  The literature on the domestic mergers and acquisitions by country is unanimous: 
shareholders of target firms invariably receive large premiums (on average between 20-40%) 
relative to the pre-announcement share price. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Servaes (1991), 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), for instance, report average US target abnormal returns of 29% Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   4 
   
for 1963-86, 24% for 1972-1987 and 27% for 1971-82, respectively. In the 1990s, abnormal 
announcement returns in the US remained at as similar level of 21% (Mulherin and Boone 
2000). In contrast, there is little consensus about the announcement wealth effects for the 
bidding firms. About half of the studies report small negative returns for the acquirers (see e.g. 
Walker 2000, Mitchell and Stafford 2000, Sirrower 1994, and Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1992) 
whereas the other half finds zero or small positive abnormal returns (see e.g. Eckbo and 
Thorburn 2000, Maquiera et al. 1998, Schwert 1996, and Loderer 1990). Considering that the 
average target is much smaller than the average acquirer, the combined net economic gain at 
announcement is only just positive.  
 
  Previous research on cross-border M&A activity is largely confined to the UK and US. 
Similar to domestic acquisitions, the shareholders of US target firms can pocket large positive 
abnormal returns (see e.g. Harris and Ravenscraft 1991, Cebenoyan et al. 1992, and Cheng and 
Chan 1995) in cross-border bids. Two studies analyse cross-border acquisitions between US 
and UK companies: Conn and Connell (1990) for the period 1971-80 and Feils (1993) for the 
period 1980-90. Both studies conclude that the wealth effect for US target firms is substantially 
larger than for UK firms (40% versus 18% in Conn and Connell and 26% versus 16% in Feils). 
Danbolt (2002) finds no statistical difference between short-run abnormal returns for UK 
targets of domestic mergers and acquisitions (18.46%) and those of cross-border takeovers 
(19.68%). Both Wansley et al. (1983) and Dewenter (1995) suggest that the cross-border 
returns-effect for target US firms results from differences in the bid characteristics of domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions rather than from fundamental differences in the level of abnormal 
returns. Such a conclusion is also reached for UK target firms by Danbolt (2002): the target 
cross-border effect appears to be attributable to the method  of payment, bid outcome and 
industrial sector.  
 
  The M&A literature has discovered a variety of profitability drivers. First, the 
announcement of tender offers and hostile acquisitions generates higher target as well as bidder 
returns than the announcement of friendly mergers or acquisitions (see e.g. Gregory 1998, 
Loughran and Vijh 1997, and Lang et al. 1989). Second, when the bidding management owns 
large equity stakes, bidding firms obtain higher returns (see e.g. Healy et al. 1997, and Agarwal 
and Mandelker 1987). This suggests that when managers do not own equity, agency problems 
may be higher. The bidder’s shareholders may hence believe that managers may give priority to 
growth strategies (including value-destroying mergers) rather than focus on shareholder value Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   5 
   
maximisation. Third, all-cash bids generate higher target and bidder returns than stock-for-
stock acquisitions (see e.g. Yook 2000, Franks and Harris 1989, Franks et al. 1988, and Huang 
and Walking 1989). The announcement that an equity bid is made may signal to the market that 
the bidding managers believe that their firm’s shares are overpriced. This is in line with the fact 
that managers time the issues of shares to occur at the high point of the stock market cycle. 
Fourth, acquiring firms with excess cash destroy value by overbidding. Several papers have 
unearthed evidence that free cash flow (Jensen 1986) is frequently used for managerial empire 
building (see e.g. Servaes 1991, and Lang et al. 1991). Fifth, corporate diversification strategies 
destroy value (Maquiera et al. 1998, Berger and Ofek 1995). This confirms that companies 
should not attempt to do what investors can do better themselves, i.e. creating a diversified 
portfolio. Sixth, the acquisition of value-companies leads to higher bidder and target returns. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that the acquisition of firms with low market-to-book ratios 
generates high abnormal returns (of about 12% on average) for the shareholders of the bidding 
firm whereas the acquisition of firms with high market-to-book ratios generates substantial 
negative abnormal returns.
3   
 
  Possible motives for both national and cross-country bids are synergies and the 
correction of managerial failure. Synergies create value and can be of two types. They are 
called operating synergies if there are economies of scale or scope, and are called informational 
synergies if the value of the merged firms is higher than the sum of the individual firm values. 
For example, informational synergies consist in the creation of an internal capital market: slack-
rich firms with poor investment possibilities acquire slack-poor firms with outstanding growth 
opportunities.
4 Informational synergies can also consist in minimising transaction costs or 
bankruptcy costs. However, Warner (1977) shows that the reduction in direct bankruptcy costs 
(due to less than perfectly correlated earnings of the bidder firm and the target firm) is small. 
The role of hostile acquisitions as a disciplinary force to remove poorly performing 
management in Anglo-American markets is also often suggested as a motive. This market for 
corporate control seems to be more active in the US (Morck et al. 1988, Bhide 1989, Martin 
and McConnell 1991) than in the UK (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001).  
                                                 
 
3 For an excellent overview of post-merger performance and of the motives for mergers and tender offers: see 
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000) 
 
4 However, the empirical evidence investigating the creation of an internal capital market shows that diversified 
firms do not rely significantly less on the outside capital market than undiversified firms (Comment and Jarrell 
1995). Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   6 
   
 
  Theories based on i ndustrial organization suggest a powerful motive for cross-
border deals. Firms expanding into foreign markets can capture rents that are not competitively 
priced due to imperfect international product and factor markets. For example, differential tax 
systems between nations can have an impact on the marginal productivity of foreign direct 
investment through acquisitions (Scholes and Wolfson 1991). Whereas Servaes and Zenner 
(1994) provide strong evidence that taxes affect the abnormal returns earned by US targets of 
foreign acquisitions, Kang (1993) does not corroborate this finding for Japanese bidders. In 
addition to product and factor market imperfections, differences in takeover legislation and 
regulations may contribute to the differences in wealth effects of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions (Kuipers, Miller and Patel 2002). Finally, imperfect capital markets also allow 
firms to exploit favourable exchange rate movements by moving operations into other countries 
or by acquiring foreign firms (Froot and Stein 1991, Cebenoyan et al. 1992, Kang 1993).  
 
  In this paper, we investigate the short-term returns in large European domestic and 
cross-border mergers and acquistions. We also analyse whether the type of offer has an 
important impact on the premium paid for the target’s shares. Furthermore, we look at the 
possible impact of different means of payment on the bid premium: the different means are all-
cash offers, all-equity offers and bids combining cash, equity and loan notes. Given that the 
level of stock market development and the corporate governance regulation differ substantially 
between the UK and Continental Europe, we investigate whether the abnormal returns for 
targets and bidders are significantly different. Industry effects and year-of-bid effects are also 
taken into account. We examine the announcement effect of unsuccessful bids to check whether 
the market already accounts for this ultimate effect at the moment of the first announcement.  
 
 
3.  Data and methodology  
 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
 
 
Data on European acquisitions  – involving both a European bidder and target  – were 
collected from the ‘Foreign deals’ section of the monthly  Mergers & Acquisitions Report for 
the period 1993-2000. This report records the names of the firms involved in the acquisition, 
the value of the transaction (in USD and local currency) and the type of deal (merger, 
acquisition, acquisition of majority/minority control, or divestiture). Additional information, Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   7 
   
such as the means of payment in the offer, the status of the bid (hostile or friendly) and 
multiple-bidder involvement, is also frequently reported. To be included in our sample, either 
the bidder or the target (or both) must be listed on a European stock exchange, and the 
announcement date must be available. We restricted the sample to large acquisitions only, with 
a deal value of at least USD 100 million (equivalent to about  € 90 million at the current 
exchange rate). We also used information from the Financial Times (FT) to check the data 
quality from t he Mergers & Acquisitions Report (hereafter the Report), and to collect missing 
information such as missing announcement dates. We also required that at least two articles 
about the mergers and acquisitions had been published in the Financial Times so as to exclude 
non-recurring rumours. The resulting sample consists of 228 merger or acquisition 
announcements. Cases where a bid is made for only part of a firm (a divestiture) are also 
included in the sample. In these cases, the target share price reaction is that of the divesting 
firm.  
 
We adopt the distinction between mergers and acquisitions made by the FT and the 
Report. Both sources describe a merger as a transaction between two parties of roughly equal 
size, whereas in a (friendly) acquisition the larger party takes over the smaller one. A 
acquisition (attempt) is classified as hostile, if the board of directors of the potential target 
rejects the offer for whatever reason. Hostility may, among others, result from a bargaining 
strategy to extract a higher premium for the target shareholders (Schwert 2000) or from the 
target’s directors’ viewpoint that the proposed plan is incompatible with the target’s strategy. 
We also consider all acquisitions with multiple bidders to be hostile and report these cases 
separately. Lack of share price and/or accounting information reduced the sample to 187 offer 
announcements in 18 European countries. Out of these 187 bids, 142 bidders and 134 targets 
are listed. The final sample consists of 56 mergers, 41 (friendly) acquisitions, 40 hostile 
acquisitions, 21 hostile acquisitions with multiple bidders, and 29 divestitures. Twenty-four 
percent of all the bids were ultimately unsuccessful. The total number of bids can be subdivided 
into 118 domestic and 69 cross-border bids. Almost all the divestitures and 59% of the bids for 
entire companies were in cash only. Twenty-three percent of mergers and acquisitions bids 
were entirely equity financed whereas the remainder was financed by a combination of cash, 
equity and loan notes. Table 1 summarises the bid characteristics of our sample. 
[Insert tables 1 and 2 about here] 
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Table 2 shows that 63% of the large European mergers and acquisitions bids launched 
over the period 1993-2000 targeted a firm in the same country as the one of the bidder. 
Although 63% of all domestic bids happened in the UK, UK targets and bidders were relatively 
less involved in cross-border acquisitions (with 27.5% of the total bids). German, Austrian and 
Swiss firms were almost as frequently involved in cross-border acquisitions as UK firms, both 
as bidders and targets. As expected, hostile bids are concentrated in the UK and Ireland: in 
these countries 77% of all domestic hostile bids and about half of all hostile cross-border bids 
were made.  
 
Information on share prices and market indices, on the risk-free rate by country (3-month 
Treasury Bill rates), on risk measures and accounting information, was collected from 
Datastream. Additional information on both targets and bidders was obtained from Datastream 
and the Financial Times: this information includes the industry codes (SIC), i.e. our measure of 
the degree of corporate diversification, financial data, the value of the bid and the means of 
payment for the bid. Panel A of table 3 shows that the market capitalisations of the target and 
bidder are not that different. This is a consequence of our sample selection criterion of a 
minimum bid value of USD 100 million. However, target firms seem to have somewhat higher 
growth opportunities as suggested by the slightly higher market-to-book ratio for the targets of 
4.3 compared to 4.0 for the bidders. Furthermore, both the target’s corporate performance 
(return on equity) and interest coverage are better than those of bidding firms. Panel B shows 
that the average bid value is USD 1.67 billion with a distribution which is strongly skewed to 
the right. In addition, panel B shows that the larger bids consist of a higher proportion of equity. 
 [Insert table 3 about here] 
 
3.2   Methodology 
 
We measure the short-term wealth effects for bidding and target firms by calculating the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) in an event study. The announcement data of 
the merger was taken from the Mergers & Acquisitions Report and verified to be the first public 
announcement that a bid was made or was going to be made. The event window starts 6 months 
before the announcement date to capture the effects of rumours or insider trading. There is little 
consensus about the start of the period for the measurement of the short-term wealth effects, as 
evidenced by the great variety of starting dates in published work. On one hand, the 
measurement error may be substantial when using narrow event windows especially if there Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   9 
   
was a leakage of information before the first mention in the financial press. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that bids follow positive movements in the acquirer’s stock price. Hence, there 
may be a danger that by starting the measurement period too early, the actual M&A returns will 
be overstated.  
 
To calculate the expected returns and verify the robustness of the returns, we use 6 
different measures of beta (see appendix). First, we estimate the beta by running the market 
model over a 9 -month period (195 trading days) ending 6 months prior to the event date. 
Second, as the beta from the first method is calculated over a period well before the event date, 
we estimate the beta over the 9 -month period ending 1 month before the event date. This 
second method may be better at taking into account recent changes in systematic risk, but in 
turn may be influenced by the event itself. Third, we use the Datastream beta which is corrected 
for mean-reversion. Fourth, we also adjust betas for mean-reversion using the Merrill Lynch 
method based on Blume (1979) in the following way: ?i
a = .34 + ?i * .67 where ?i
a is the beta 
adjusted for mean-reversion and ?i is the beta estimated using the market model over a 9-month 
period ending 6 months prior to the event. Fifth, the betas from method 1 are corrected for 
reversion to the mean according to Vasicek’s technique using Bayesian updating (Vasicek 
















?i1)] · ?i1 , where ?i
v is the Vasicek-beta for security i, 
?
*
1 is the average beta across the sample of shares estimated over the 9-month period ending 6 
months prior to the event date (period 1), ?i1 is the beta from the market model over period 1, 
?
2
?i1 is the variance of the estimate of beta for security i measured over period 1, and ?
2
?*1 is 
the variance of the average beta measured over period 1 (Elton and Gruber 1995). Sixth, we 
calculate Dimson-betas to control for inaccurate beta-estimation resulting from thin trading 
which biases beta downwards (Dimson 1979, Marsh and Dimson 1983). These betas are the 
sum of 5 parameter estimates of the market model in which the current level of the daily market 
return, as well as its first three lags and one lead are included. The model is estimated over the 
9-month period ending 6 months prior to the event date.
5 For all 6 estimation methods, the betas 
are trimmed at the 5%-95% distribution range. As none of the main results of this study are 
influenced by the choice of the beta estimation technique, we only report results based on the 
Dimson-betas corrected for thin trading.  
                                                 
5 The systematic risk of all 6 estimation techniques is calculated using the all-share index for each country. For 
example, the betas of UK targets and bidders are calculated using the FT-All Share Index. Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   10 
   
 
  The abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual daily 
returns and the expected returns obtained from the CAPM. The cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) are then calculated over the event period. The standard significance tests we 
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 where T is the number of time observations. The total 
gain for each pair of target firm and acquiring firm is measured by: 
Acquirer et T
Acquirer Acquirer et T et T
Total
MV MV





arg arg * *
 
where MV denotes the market value of the target’s or acquirer’s equity before the beginning of 
the event window (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). 
 
 
4.  Short-term shareholder wealth effects  
 
In this section we focus on univariate analyses of the bid premiums. We relate the 
cumulative abnormal returns to one specific bid or corporate characteristic at the time. In 
section 6, we estimate the impact for all the explanatory factors simultaneously. 
 
4.1 Target versus bidding firms 
 
 
Panel A of table 4  and  igure 1a  show that the announcement of a takeover bid causes 
substantial positive abnormal returns for the shareholders of the target. On the event day, an 
abnormal return of 9% is realised. Strikingly, as the cumulative abnormal returns over the event 
window starting two months prior to and including the event date amount to about 23%, it 
seems that the bid was anticipated, probably as a result of rumours or of insider trading. On 
average, investors owning a target company for a period starting 3 months prior to the event 
date (60 trading days) and selling at the end of the event day would earn a return of 24%. After 
about 30 trading days, the average cumulative abnormal return decreases by about 3% as a Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   11 
   
result of the fact that some bids are unsuccessful or the fact that a long period to finalise the 
offer raises doubt about the ultimate success of the negotiations.
6 
 
Panel B of table 4 and figure 1b shows that the effect of the M&A announcement on the 
wealth of the bidding shareholders is small: at the announcement, there is an abnormal return of 
0.7% (significant at the 1% level). For the 5-day window centred on the event day, there is a 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of 1.2%. However, the CAARs for the 
longer event windows are not statistically significant. In the next section, we will show that the 
wealth effects for bidders are larger and depend upon the status of the bid (hostile versus 
friendly offer).  
The CAARs obtained by this study are close to the ones reported by Franks and Harris 
(1989) and Higson and Elliott (1998). Franks and Harris report CAARs of 21% for large UK 
targets and of 0% for UK bidders over the period 1955-85 in the event month. Higson and 
Elliott find CAARs of 30% for the target shareholders in the largest bids and of 0% for the 
bidding shareholders over the period 1975-90. Recent research on the wealth effects for cross-
border acquisitions by UK firms corroborates the results from earlier research that such 
operations do not generate any gain (or loss) for the bidding shareholders (Gregory and 
McCorriston 2002, Conn et al. 2001) 
 [Insert table 4 and figures 1a and 1b about here] 
 
4.2 Hostile versus friendly bids 
 
We also analyse t he market reactions to the different types of takeovers. For the target 
firms, we distinguish between mergers (40 cases), friendly acquisitions (53 cases), hostile 
acquisitions (28 cases) and bids with multiple bidders (14 cases). For all of these types of bids, 
there is a strong positive announcement effect (significant at the 1% level), as shown in panel A 
of table 5 and figure 2a. As expected, hostile bids generate the largest abnormal returns for the 
target (13%) on the announcement day. These returns are significantly higher than the ones for 
the other types, i.e. only 9% for mergers and 6% for acquisitions. When a hostile bid is made, 
the share price of the target immediately reflects the expectation that opposition to the bid will 
lead to upward revisions of the offer price. Surprisingly, the announcement reaction to a 
                                                 
6 After the first announcement of a bid, it still takes several months before the merger or acquisition is accepted 
and the target firm stops trading. In only 11 out of 129 cases, the target firm is no longer traded within 40 trading Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   12 
   
situation with multiple bidders is low at 7%, but there is a large upward price movement 
starting already 1.5 months prior to the announcement. Panel A also reports that there are large 
differences in the price run-ups for the different types of bids. Whereas the upward price 
reactions prior to the bid announcement are limited to two weeks for hostile acquisitions and 
for friendly acquisitions, it seems that in the case of mergers, rumours or insider trading occurs 
already 1.5 to 2 months prior to the announcement (not shown). A hostile acquisition 
announcement generates a CAAR of more than 29% over the 2 month-period preceding and 
including the announcement day. At the event date and over the 2 months prior to the first 
announcement of the bid, the returns to the target shareholders for hostile acquisitions vastly 
outperform those of friendly mergers and acquisitions (panel B of table 5). The difference in 
returns between merger and friendly acquisition announcements is limited to the event date and 
to the 2-week period prior to the announcement. For the longer symmetric event windows (6 
months and longer) differences between the types of bids are no longer statistically significant.  
 
Panel C of table 5 and figure 2b break down the CAAR for the bidder by type of bidding 
firm. The shareholders of bidding firms clearly react differently to announcements of mergers, 
acquisitions and hostile acquisitions. The abnormal return on the event day is 2.2% and 2.43% 
for mergers and unopposed acquisitions, respectively. However, on average, the bidder’s 
shareholders seem to disapprove of hostile acquisitions. When the bid is contested, the 
announcement abnormal return is  –2.5%. Panel D of table 5 shows that the differences in 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
[Insert table 5 and figures 2a and 2b about here] 
 
4.3 UK versus Continental Europe. 
 
As 85% of the companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are widely held, there is 
an active market for corporate control and UK firms are continually up for auction. In contrast, 
in Continental Europe the number of listed firms is much lower and most listed firms (around 
85%-90% for Germany and France) have concentrated ownership or control (for a detailed 
overview of ownership a nd control in Europe, see Barca and Becht 2001). Consequently, 
hostile acquisitions are rare in Continental Europe. Not surprisingly, about half of the sample of 
target and bidding firms that are listed on a stock market is from the UK and Ireland (70 out of 
                                                                                                                                                           
days subsequent to the announcement. Respectively, 24 and 36 target firms are delisted 60 and 100 trading days Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   13 
   
136 targets and 66 out of 142 bidders). As there is a high degree of disclosure in the UK, a 
liquid and well-developed equity market (McCahery and Renneboog 2002) and a higher degree 
of shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 1997), we expect higher premiums in bids for UK 
firms. Panel A of table 6 and figure 3a  confirm this conjecture: the announcement effect is 
substantially larger for the UK target firms (12.3%) than for the Continental European ones 
(6%). There is not much difference in terms of the price run-up in the targets prior to the 
announcement: in both Continental Europe and in the UK, significant positive abnormal returns 
are generated 2 to 3 months prior to the announcement. UK target shareholders who own equity 
as of 2 months prior to the announcement and sell on the day of the announcement can earn (on 
average) a premium of more than 38%, more than double the return earned by the Continental 
European target shareholders (15%) over the same period (panel A of table 6). Whereas the 
post-announcement CAARs are not statistically different from zero, they are substantially 
negative for Continental European targets for the 1.5 to 3 months after the announcement day. 
Hence, in spite of the lower bid premiums in Continental Europe, it seems that the market price 
reactions to the announcements are overoptimistic and that returns are subsequently corrected.
7  
 
Panel B of table 6 report and figure 3b the returns for the shareholders of the bidding 
firms. Bidding shareholders in UK firms earn more than those in Continental European firms. 
Over a five-day window centred on the announcement date, UK bidders obtain a cumulative 
abnormal return of 1.5% versus only 0.9% for Continental European bidders. Whereas there is 
evidence of trading on rumours in the target shares or of insider trading, this is not the case for 
the bidding firms.  
[insert table 6 and figures 3a and 3b about here] 
 
4.4 Domestic versus cross-border acquisitions.  
 
In this section, we distinguish between domestic and cross-border bids. As pointed out 
before, 63% of large European mergers and acquisitions are domestic. Table 7 shows that the 
announcement effect for domestic and cross-border targets amounts to 10.2% and 11.3%, 
respectively; the difference is not statistically significant. However, when we include the price 
run-up period (40 trading days prior to the event), we find a statistically significant difference 
                                                                                                                                                           
subsequent to the announcement. We reduce the event window of target firms to 80 days after the event day. 
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(within the 5% level) of 2.9% (22.7%-18.8%). The main reason why on average higher 
premiums are paid for domestic targets than for cross-border targets is that the sample of 
domestic M&As includes a higher proportion of UK targets (46% versus 28% in the cross-
border takeover sample; see table 2).  
 
In all countries (apart from the Benelux countries), higher premiums are paid for targets in 
cross-border bids than for those in  domestic M&As. This is surprising as UK firms are more 
frequently the target of hostile domestic acquisitions than of hostile cross-border bids. In 
section 6, we further investigate whether other bid characteristics (such as the means of 
payment) can explain the higher CAARs in cross-border acquisitions.  
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
4.5. Means of payment in takeover bids. 
 
The average bid value of our sample is USD 5,469 million. The distribution of the bid 
value is highly skewed, as the median value is only USD 575 million. The majority of bids 
(excluding the divestitures (see section 4.8)) are cash offers (93 out of 156 cases or 60%). 
Twenty-four per cent of the offers are all-equity offers and the remainder consists of 
combinations of cash and equity (11%), of cash and loan notes (2%), of equity and loan notes 
(2%), and of cash, equity and loan notes (1%). Payment for smaller targets is usually done in 
cash: the average value of all-cash offers amounts to USD 1,489 million while that of all-equity 
offers is USD 14,255 million (with medians of USD 443 and 2,580 million, respectively). In 12 
cases out of the 93 all-cash offers, the bidder also gave the target the opportunity to accept an 
all-equity offer or a combined offer (with a higher value than the cash offer).
8  
 
If the managers of an acquiring firm know that their shares are worth more than their 
current market price, they should prefer to finance the acquisition with cash. Hence, future 
changes in the stock price will only benefit the shareholders of the bidding firm. Conversely, if 
the bidding management believes that its stock is overvalued, they should prefer to pay for the 
acquisition with equity. Hence, asymmetric information between bidder’s management and 
                                                                                                                                                           
7 The post-announcement correction in abnormal returns is not due to a higher rate of failed bids, as there are more 
failed bids (related to hostile takeover attempts) in the UK than in Continental Europe.  
8 This choice between an all-cash offer and a combined cash-and-equity offer is given in all 12 cases at the first 
announcement of the bid. In contrast, in 4 cases, a cash offer was added to an initial all-equity or combined offer as 
a sweetener some time after the first announcement. Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   15 
   
outside investors on the bidder’s market value may have some bearing on the choice between 
cash or equity payments in an offer. 
 
We find strong evidence that the share price reaction for the target is sensitive to the 
means of payment for its shares. Cash offers trigger substantially higher abnormal returns (10% 
at the announcement) than offers including the bidders’ equity (6.7%) and combined offers of 
cash and equity (5.6%) (panel A of table 8 and figure 4a).  Panel A of table 8 shows that when 
the price run-up starting two weeks prior to the event day is included, cash offers trigger 
CAARs of almost 20% versus 14% and 12.5% for all-equity bids and combined bids, 
respectively. Panel B shows that whatever the event window the CAARs of cash-financed bids 
are significantly higher than those of other bids at the 1% significance level.  Panel B of table 8 
and figure 4b show an entirely different picture for bidding firms. Over both short and longer 
term windows, the shareholders of the acquiring firms greet equity offers more favourably (1%) 
than cash offers (0.4%).  This implies that the choice to make an all-equity offer does not 
suggest to the market that the bidder’s equity is overvalued. Within the sample of large take-
over bids, the relatively smaller ones are all-cash bids whereas the relatively larger ones involve 
equity. Consequently, it may be that the market realises that for large deals the choice of means 
of payment is restricted. 
[insert table 8 and figures 4a and 4b about here] 
 
4.6. Takeover bids by industry. 
 
In this sub-section, we check whether our results are driven by particular industries. We 
created the following 5 industry groups based on the SIC classification: (i) energy, natural 
resources, waste development and utilities (9 firms) (ii) production and manufacturing (49 
firms), (iii) services (36 firms), (iv) retailers, stores, pubs, hotels (23 firms) and (v) banking and 
insurance (19 firms). On the announcement day, bids for retail and manufacturing firms trigger 
the strongest positive abnormal returns, 14.4% and 10.9%, respectively (panel A of table 9 and 
figure 5a). For longer time intervals of e.g. two months there are no substantial differences 
between the different industries. Our results for banks are consistent with the findings of Cybo-
Ottone and Murgia (2000), who found a significant and positive 15.3% announcement effect 
for European target banks. The strong decline in abnormal returns of financial and energy target 
firms reflects the fact that a few of the bids were ultimately unsuccessful.   
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However, the picture for bidding firms by industry looks different. Some industries show 
positive CAARs (manufacturing, retailing) whereas other industries have negative 
announcement effects (energy, services). The latter difference is largely due to the fact that the 
energy and services industries count more hostile acquisitions (see section 4 .2). Financial 
bidders (banks and insurance companies) realise insignificant positive returns, but significantly 
negative CAARs over longer time periods (panel B of table 9 and figure 5b). These findings are 
consistent with those from Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) for E urope and Frame and 
Lastrapes (1990) for the US.  
[insert table 9 and figures 5a and 5b about here] 
 
4.7 Ultimately failed versus successful bids.  
 
In this section, we address the question as to whether the markets are able to anticipate the 
ultimate success or failure of the merger negotiations. The merger or acquisition negotiations 
are assumed to be ultimately successful if the Financial Times reports acceptance of the bid by 
the target’s shareholders. Conversely, the takeover attempt is considered to be a failure if the 
bidder abandons negotiations within a 6-month period subsequent to the announcement. Out of 
the 187 announcements 37 failed. Out of the announcements involving listed target firms 
(excluding divestitures), 27 were unsuccessful of which, only 16 were categorised as hostile 
bids due to resistance by the target’s management or due to the fact that multiple firms were 
attempting to acquire the target. Hence, there were also 11 cases for which the friendly merger 
or acquisitions negotiations broke down. For both t he (ultimately) failed and successful bids, 
we find a significant positive announcement effect for the target firms (panel A of table 10). 
The event-day effect is significantly larger (by 5%) for the successful bids than for the failures. 
However, for the two-week window prior to and including the event day, there is no difference 
in the CAARs between failed and successful bids. When the price run-up over a 3-month period 
is included, the failed bids significantly outperform the successful bids by 7% (30% versus 
23%). Whereas the cumulative abnormal returns for the targets in the successful bids are not 
significantly different from zero subsequent to the announcement, the abnormal returns for the 
failed bids nose-dive (by 7.5%) over the 2 and 3 months subsequent to the event. This is a result 
of the collapse of the (friendly) merger negotiations or of the successful hostile opposition by 
the target’s management shareholders. However, it should be noticed that the cumulative 
abnormal return for the companies on which a failed bid was launched does not revert to the 
level prior to the announcement. This implies that the stock prices of these targets – in spite of Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   17 
   
the breakdown of the merger or acquisition negotiations  - still contain a merger premium 
reflecting the possibility of another potential bid in the near future.  
 
The announcement effect for unsuccessful bidders is negative, but not statistically 
significant from zero (panel B of table 10). This negative effect can be explained by the fact 
that two thirds of the subsample of failed bids consist of hostile acquisitions (see section 4.2).  
[insert table 10 about here] 
 
4.8 Bids made prior and subsequent to 1 January 1999 
 
M&A activity during the 1990s is characterised by continuous increases in volume, in 
average bid value and hence in total bid value. European M&A activity grew in value by more 
than 280% over the period of 1996-99. The year 1999 was not only remarkable in terms of the 
total bid value (USD 1,560 million), but also in terms of the number of hostile acquisitions: 
there was a staggering number of 369 hostile offers. Shelton (2000) reports evidence that bidder 
gains fall during merger peaks, suggesting that bidders are more aggressive, display greater 
tendencies to over-pay for target firms or assume more risk in pursuing M&A projects. Hence, 
we split the bids into two categories based on the period in which they were made: bids before 
1999 and those in 1999-2000. About half of the bids were made in 1999-2000.
9 A possible 
difference in wealth effects between the two periods may result from the introduction of the 
Euro. However, panel A of table 11 and figure 7a show that, on the announcement day, there is 
little difference in terms of the price reaction for bids that took place prior to 1999 and those in 
1999-2000: for both samples the abnormal return is around 9%. However, the price run-up for 
pre-1999 offers started only one month prior to the announcement whereas the one for the bids 
in 1999-2000 already started 3 months prior to the announcement. Over long windows, for 
instance over a 6-month symmetric event window, the recent bids yield higher CAARs (almost 
25%) than the pre-1999 ones (19%). We also investigate the difference in announcement 
reactions for firms bidding prior to and after 1 January 1999, but do not find any difference in 
abnormal returns (panel B of table 11 and figure 7b). 
[insert table 11 and figures 7a and 7b about here] 
 
                                                 
 
9 An analysis of the takeovers by year for the period 1993-1998 does not give significant differences in abnormal 
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4.9 Divesting firms 
 
The 187 announcements include 29 bids for a division of a listed firm rather than an entire 
firm. In all 29 cases the initial bid is a friendly attempt, but one case involved multiple bidders. 
In half of the cases, bidder and target are located in the same Continental European country and 
in more than one third of the cases bidder and target are UK-based. Ninety per cent of the bids 
are c ash financed. Two offers were financed by both cash and loan notes and in one case a 
combination of equity and loan notes was offered. The market value of the divestitures is 
smaller than the one of the average bid for an entire firm and averages USD 480 m illion 
(median of USD 415). Table 12 and figure 8 show that the announcement of the divestitures is 
greeted by the market as positive news for the divesting firm as the CAAR for the 5-day 
window centred on the event day is 3.5% (significant at the 1% level). The reasons that are 
reported for the divesture in the announcement press statements include return to core business 
(69%) and the generation of cash to pursue a focus strategy (21%).  
 
Hanson and Song (2000) find that buyers and sellers on average earn significant positive 
abnormal returns, although significant returns only occur during the 1990–1995 period. Recent 
research on US divestitures by Mulherin and Boone (2000) for the period 1990–99 concludes 
that the combined target and bidder return at the announcement averages 3.5%, while the 
announcement return for corporate divestitures averages 3%. The results are consistent with the 
views that divestitures create value by transferring assets to a more efficient firm and that 
divestitures resolve agency problems.  
[insert table 12 and figure 8 about here] 
 
5. Takeover motives: synergies, agency or hubris? 
 
Although most bidding firms make statements about the potential synergies from mergers 
and acquisitions, frequently the forecasted benefits are not obtained. This may be the result of 
over-optimistic synergy forecasts by the bidding management or the fact that the merger or 
acquisition was initiated for entirely different reasons such as managerial hubris or other 
agency problems. We will attempt to distinguish between these three different takeover motives 
by performing a correlation analysis of the target, bidder and total announcement gains.  
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If synergies are the main motive for the merger, we assume that the managers of both the 
target and acquirer intend to maximise shareholder value. Hence, the wealth effects of the 
merger or acquisition for both the target’s and bidder’s shareholders should be positive and the 
division of the value created should depend on the relative bargaining power of target and 
bidder. In addition, the wealth gains for the target shareholders should be positively correlated 
to both those of the bidder shareholders and to the total wealth effect.  
 
A second motive for a merger or acquisition may be agency related: in this case, the self-
interest of the bidder’s management is the prime reason for the offer. Managers may prefer to 
stimulate corporate growth rather than corporate value as their private benefits tend to grow 
with firm size. For example, Conyon and Murphy (2002) show that for the UK, size (and not 
performance) is the main determinant of the level of managerial salaries, bonuses as well as of 
the allotment of share options. Hence, managers may be tempted to use free cash flow for 
‘empire building’ (Jensen 1986). Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that managers 
may make acquisitions such that the combined entity will depend even more on their personal 
expertise. Hence, they may exploit this dependency and extract value from the acquirer: both 
the total value of the combined entity as well as the wealth of the bidder’s shareholders will be 
lower. As a result, the correlations between the target’s value and the bidder’s value and 
between the target’s value and the total value will be negative.  
 
A third M&A motive may be the bidding management’s hubris, which hinges on the 
assumption that the management makes mistakes in evaluating potential targets (Roll 1986). If 
there is an equal probability that managers are over- and underestimating the synergies of 
potential mergers or acquisitions, and managers make a bid after having overestimated synergy 
values, they may mostly pay too much for the target. As a result, the higher the target’s gain, 
the lower the bidder’s gain, such that there is a wealth transfer from the bidder to the target 
when the total gain is zero (Berkovitch and Narayanan 1993). Hence, the correlation between 
the target’s and bidder’s wealth changes is negative whereas the one between the target’s and 
total wealth change is zero. Panel A of table 13 summarizes the expected signs of the 
correlations.  
 
In order to test these hypotheses, we select the 68 bids which involve both a listed target 
and a listed bidder. The average total gain is calculated on the event day (panel B of table 13) 
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target as weights. Total wealth gains over these periods amount to 4% and 6%, respectively, of 
the combined entity. Fifty-eight per cent of mergers and acquisitions in this sample have 
positive total  wealth gains. For the whole sample, we find that the correlations between the 
target’s gain and the total gain in panel B are significantly positive. Even when we measure the 
wealth gains over a longer window, the correlation between the target and the bidder gains 
remains significantly positive. This suggests that, on average, the large European M&A bids in 
the 1990s are motivated by synergies. However, as the motives for individual firms may still be 
different, we also analyse the correlations for the subsamples of takeovers with positive versus 
negative total wealth effects. We find that the synergy hypothesis for the firms with positive 
wealth effects is corroborated (see panel C). In contrast, for the bids with negative total gains, 
we find no correlation between target gain and total gain and a negative correlation – albeit 
only statistically significant for longer term windows – between target and bidder gains. This 
suggests that in about a third of the firms, managerial hubris may, to a large extent,  be 
responsible for poor decision making about merger or acquisition bids. The findings from this 
study are in line with those of Gupta et al. (1997) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) who 
both find strong evidence that synergy is the prime motive for mergers and acquisitions. The 
latter study also finds evidence that agency problems and hubris are a relatively frequent motive 
for acquisitions.  
[insert table 13 about here] 
 
6.  Determinants of short-run wealth effects for target and bidding firms. 
 
We regress  the cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms (in separate 
regressions) over two different windows ([-1, 0] and [-10,0]) on variables capturing:  
(i)  the status of the bid (merger, friendly acquisition, hostile acquisition),  
(ii)  the means of payment (all-cash offer, all-equity offer or a combination of cash, 
equity or loan notes),  
(iii)  the takeover characteristics (relative size: target/bidder),  
(iv)  the target and bidder characteristics (net cash held by target over market value of 
equity, performance of target, interest coverage of target, growth potential of target 
(MV/BV), degree of diversification of bidder, industry of target and bidder) 
(v)  the location of the target and bidder firm (domestic versus cross-border; and country 
of the target)  
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We correct both target and bidder regressions for industry effects. The sample size is 136 for 
the target firms and 142 for the bidder firms.  
 
Table 14 shows that the status of the bid is an important determinant of the short-term 
wealth effects (on the event day and for the ten-day period including the price-run up) for both 
target and bidder firms. In comparison to merger offers, hostile bids trigger large positive 
abnormal returns for the target shareholders but significantly negative abnormal returns for the 
bidder. This follows from the fact that bidder shareholders are fearful that the management’s 
motives for the bid are hubris or agency related. In contrast, target shareholders expect that 
opposition against the offer will lead to upwardly revised bid prices. Friendly acquisitions are 
slightly underperforming – from the perspective of the target shareholders - other types of bids. 
When the offer is entirely cash financed, the target’s share price will increase more than when 
the bid consists of an all-equity offer or a combination of equity, cash and loan notes. An all-
cash offer may signal that the bidder’s equity is undervalued. It may also signal the bidder’s 
confidence in successfully exploiting the potential synergies as the bidder does not want to 
share future value creation with the target shareholders. However, for the very large targets it 
may be difficult to raise large amounts of cash such that the bidder has to resort to an all-equity 
offer or at least a combined offer. The share price reaction for bidding firms to a cash offer is 
(weakly) negative. This may result from the market’s concern that management may bid too 
high a premium whereas when the target shareholders accept an equity offer, they share some 
of the risk from the acquisition.  
 
The impact  of the following target and bidder characteristics is also investigated: the 
relative size of target’s market capitalization compared to that of the bidder, the cash reserves 
held by the target firm, the target’s market-to-book ratio, the target’s return o n equity and 
interest coverage, the degree of the bidder’s diversification, the fact whether or not bidder and 
target are operating in the same industry, and the country in which the target is located. Table 
14 shows that relative size is not significant, which may be explained by the fact that this study 
only concentrates on large European deals (of over USD 100 million). The amount of cash 
reserves held by the target company may have an impact on the size of the bid premium and 
hence on the announcement effect, because a target firm with substantial cash reserves may in 
fact provide the bidder with part of the necessary finance to fund the merger or acquisition. 
However, table 14 shows that this is not the case for the firms in our sample. For a target firm 
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expects a premium whereas table 14 suggests that the market is anxious that the bidder will 
overpay for growth options.
10 Whereas the financial distress measure (interest coverage) does 
not have any bearing on the abnormal returns of the targets and bidders, there is some (weak) 
evidence that the target’s performance (measured by the return on equity) is positively related 
to the merger or acquisition premium. The fact that a bidder implements a focused merger or 
acquisition strategy (i.e taking over a firm in the same industry) does not have any short-term 
wealth effects on the bidder or target. In contrast, we find some evidence of significantly 
negative abnormal returns (at the 10% level) for bidders that are already diversified. The 
regressions also analyse whether the premiums are influenced by domestic or cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. We find evidence (at the 10% level) that domestic M&As are 
triggering  a higher premium of around 1% for the target even after correcting for the status of 
the takeover. However, bidders in domestic mergers and acquisitions bids earn marginally 
negative abnormal returns of 0.7%. We also investigate whether the location of the target has 
an impact on abnormal returns. We distinguish between targets located in (i) the UK, (ii) 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Central Europe, (iii) Southern Europe and (iv) France and 
the Benelux countries. We find strong evidence that bids involving UK targets generate 
significantly positive short-term wealth effects for both the bidder and target shareholders: the 
target’s abnormal returns increase by 7 to 9.6% and the ones for bidder increase by around 
3.3%. In bids involving German, Austrian and Swiss targets, wealth effect are also positive but 
lower (between 0.6-2.1%). As we already control for effects such as the status of the bid, 
industry, financial characteristics of the target, and means of payment, the finding that the 
location is an important determinant may be due to institutional differences. These institutional 
differences are an amalgam of ownership patterns (with the UK having a higher free float than 
Continental Europe), protection of shareholder rights (with the UK having a higher degree of 
protection than Continental Europe according to La Porta et al. 1997) and takeover regulation 
(with higher transparency in the UK).  
[insert table 14 about here] 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
The 1990s were characterised by a large increase in European M&A activity. In 1999, the 
total deal volume, the average deal value and the number of hostile acquisitions almost reached 
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US levels. In this study we analyse the market reactions to 187 large M&A deals with a value 
of at least USD 100 million. Our sample contains 56 mergers, 41 friendly acquisition, 40 hostile 
acquisitions, 21 hostile acquisitions involving multiple bidders and 29 divestitures.  
 
The short-term wealth effects found in this European (Continental Europe and UK) study 
are remarkably similar to those found by US and UK studies. We find large announcement 
effects of 9% for target firms, but the cumulative abnormal return that includes the price run-up 
over the two-month period prior to the announcement rises to 23%. Bidders react positively 
with a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7%. We also show that the status 
of the bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects for the target and bidder 
shareholders. For hostile acquisitions, the announcement effect for target firms is substantially 
higher (12.6% on day 0 and almost 30% including the price run-up) than the one for mergers 
and friendly acquisitions (8% on day 0 and 22% including the price run-up). Hence, the market 
seems to expect that opposition against a bid will lead to a revision of the offer and ultimately 
to a higher bid premium. This is confirmed by the share price reaction of bidding firms: a 
hostile acquisition triggers a negative abnormal return of 2.5% whereas the announcement of a 
merger or friendly acquisition generates a positive abnormal return of 2.5%. The location of 
bidder and target firms also seems to have an important impact on short-term wealth effects: 
both UK bidders and targets generate significantly higher returns than their Continental 
European  counterparts. This can partially be explained by the higher incidence of hostile 
acquisitions in the UK and the more developed UK market for corporate control.  
 
We also find strong evidence that the means of payment has a large impact on the wealth 
effect. All-cash offers trigger an abnormal return of almost 10% upon announcement (27.5% 
including price run-up) whereas all-equity bids or offers combining cash, equity and loan notes 
only generate a return of 6% (14% including the price run-up). Cash bids are more frequent for 
smaller targets, though. The market reacts more positively (+1%) to bidding firms which use 
equity to pay for the merger or acquisition. This implies that the choice of the means of 
payment does not act as a signal to the market about the over- or undervaluation of the bidder’s 
equity.  
 
Contrary to past research, the size of the target relative to the size of the bidder does not 
have an impact on target and bidder wealth effects. The reason for this may be that this study 
focuses on large M&A deals and that therefore the average relative size is pretty homogeneous. Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   24 
   
There is no evidence that the past returns of target and bidder firms influence the share price 
reactions around the bid announcement. However, the market-to-book ratio of the target matters 
in terms of the bid premium. A high market-to-book ratio for the target leads to a higher bid 
premium combined with a negative abnormal return for the bidder. We also find that bidding 
firms should not further diversify by acquiring target f irms that do not match their core 
business.  
 
  An interesting result is that domestic mergers or acquisitions trigger higher wealth 
effects than cross-border ones. This is surprising as foreign direct investment theories predict 
that foreign bidders may be able to take advantage of imperfections in factor and capital 
markets and thereby generate more gains. Consequently, bidders in cross-border transactions 
were expected to pay higher premiums, which according to our analysis they do not. We also 
find that the premiums paid depend on the location of the target. The country dummies we use 
proxy for institutional differences, such as different corporate governance regimes (ownership 
concentration, takeover regulation, protection of shareholder rights, and informational 
transparency). After controlling for the status of the bid (i.e. the higher frequency of hostile 
acquisitions in the UK), for means of payment, and financial characteristics of the target, we 
find substantially higher wealth effects for UK targets. This is also the case (but to a much 
smaller extent) for German, Austrian and Swiss firms but not for targets in France, the Benelux 
countries and Southern Europe.   
 
Finally, we also investigate whether the predominant reason for mergers and acquisitions 
is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. We find a significant positive correlation 
between target shareholder gains and total gains as well as between target gains and bidder 
gains. This suggests that synergies are the prime motivation for b ids and that targets and 
bidders tend to share the wealth gains. However, these findings are only valid for the bids 
generating total positive wealth gains. For bids with negative total wealth gains, there is no 
significant correlation between target and total wealth gains whereas the correlation between 
target and bidder gains is negative. This implies that  – given that the total wealth effect is 
negative – a dollar gain to the target’s shareholders coincides with a dollar loss for the bidder’s 
shareholders. Thus, it seems that for a third of firms, managerial hubris leads to poor decision 
making on mergers and acquisitions.  Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   25 
   








































RShareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   26 
   
Figure 2a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Target Firms by Type of Bid 
 
 
Figure 2b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidding Firms by Type of Bid  
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Figure 3b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of UK versus Continental European Bidding 
Firms 
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Figure 4a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Target Firms by Means of Payment 
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Figure 5a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Target Firms by Industry 
 
 
Figure 5b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidding Firms by Industry  
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Figure 6a: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Target Firms by  Ultimately Successful 




Figure 6b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of bidding firms by Ultimately  Successful and 
Failed Bids  
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Figure 7b: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidding Firms: Bids Made Pre and Post 
January 1
st 1999. 
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Figure 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Divesting Firms 
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Table 1: Sample composition: type of bid and means of payment. 
This table details the composition of the sample: it distinguishes between different types of bids and means of 
payment. Source: Source: Mergers and Acquisitions Report and Financial Times:  own calculations. 
 
 
Table 2: Country distribution of bids. 
The total number of takeover announcements is given by country. For the total number of bids by country, the 
number of listed target and bidder firms is shown. Source: Mergers and Acquisitions Report and Financial Times: 
own calculations. 
 
    Domestic bids  Cross-border bids 
                           
    number  merger  acqui-  hostile  listed  listed  number  listed  target country classification  listed 
    of bids    sition  bid  target bidder  of bids  target  merger acquisition  hostile 
bid  bidder 
All Countries  118  40  31  44  85  86  69  51  16  22  13  56 
UK/Ireland  74  24  16  34  56  52  19  14  4  4  6  14 
Germ. /Aust./Switz  7  5  2  0  6  4  18  12  3  8  1  12 
France  16  5  6  5  11  13  7  3  1  1  1  13 
Scandinavia  3  2  1  0  1  3  13  11  3  5  3  5 
Benelux  6  2  4  0  4  4  8  7  3  3  1  8 
Southern Europe  10  2  3  5  7  8  4  4  2  1  1  4 
Central Europe  2  2  0  0  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
                         
Total number of bids  187                       
 
  M&As  Divestitures
  Number  Number 
Total sample  158  29 
Mergers  56  - 
Friendly acquisitions  41  - 
Hostile acquisitions  40  - 
Multiple Bidders  21  1 
Bid on divestiture  0  28 
UK Target  59  11 
UK Bidder  53  13 
Bidder and Target same country  103  15 
All-cash Bid  93  26 
All-equity Bid  37  0 
Cash/Equity Bid  18  0 
% Cash in Cash+Equity Bids  45.9%  --- 
Cash/Loan Notes Bid  3  2 
Equity/Loan Notes Bid  3  1 
Cash/Equity/Loan Notes Bid  2  0 
Choice Cash or Equity Bid  12  0 
Equity Bid with subsequent cash 
offer   4  0 
Ultimately failed bid  39  0 
Ultimately successful bid  119  29 Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   34 
   
Table 3: Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A shows data on corporate size, growth opportunities and performance for target, bidder and divesting 
firms. Panel B shows average bid value as well as the financial composition of the bid. The market to book-value 
(MV/BV) represents the growth potential of the target, the interest coverage captures the potential financial 
distress, the amount of liquid assets (NC) (cash and short-term loans, deposits and investments) is divided by total 
market value. We calculated relative target to bidder size using the market capitalisation at least 6 months prior to 
the announcement.  Source: Mergers and Acquisitions Report and Financial Times: own calculations. 
 
Panel A: Financial data 
  Targets  Bidders  Divesting firms     
  Mean  Stdev.  Mean  Stdev.  Mean  Stdev.     
Market Capitalization ($million)  17878  15192  21568  28038  15033  29694     
MV/BV  4.26  8.88  4.01  5.20  8.13  22.3     
Ncash/MV  0.07  0.16  0.09  0.14  0.08  0.08     
Dividend yield (%)  3.97  3.50  2.78  1.59  3.19  2.27     
Interest Coverage  50.80  32.59  13.41  13.66  5.51  5.99     
Price/Cash flow  11.53  36.36  10.51  7.71  9.41  7.81     
ROE (%)  6.13  7.11  5.5  4.83  2.11  4.52     
 
Panel B: Value of bid and means of payment  (in USD million)  
M&As (158 cases)  Mean  Median  Stdev.  Min  Max  Q25  Q75 
Non-zero 
median  
Value of bid   5469  575  15694  100  147280  218  2492  575 
Cash Bid   1489  147  3403  0  24600  0  581  443 
Equity Bid   14255  0  28196  0  147280  0  100  2580 
Cash+Equity bid   3084  0  5318  0  19895  0  0  655 
Cash+Loan Notes bid   114  0  13  0  127  0  0  114 
Equity+Loan Notes bid   29881  0  15363  0  42729  0  0  34052 
Cash+Equity+Loan Notes bid   15779  0  22106  0  31410  0  0  31410 
                 
Divestitures (29 cases)                 
Value of bid   481  415  310  110  1239  $212.55 682.75   
Cash Bid   504  317  318  110  1239  160.4  681.75  423 
Cash+Loan Notes bid   217  292  106  142  292  142  292  142 
Equity+Loan Notes bid    370  0  0  0  370  0  0  370 Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   35 
   
Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for target and bidding firms. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns measured over several event windows for target and bidder 
firms. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own 
calculations. 
 
Panel A: Target firms 
Time Interval  CAAR (%)   t-value 
[-1, 0]  9.01  29.53
*** 
[-2, +2]  12.96  26.88
*** 
[-40, 0]  23.10  17.62
*** 
[-60, +60]  21.66  14.39
*** 
Observations  136   
Panel B: Bidding firms 
Time Interval  CAAR (%)   t-value 
[-1, 0]  0.70  2.98
*** 
[-2, +2]  1.18  3.18
*** 
[-40, 0]  0.40  0.64 
[-60,+60]  -0.48  -0.26 
Observations  142   
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Table 5: Cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms by status of bid. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
status of bid (merger, friendly acquisition, hostile acquisition, acquisition with multiple bidders). ***, ** and 
* stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Panel A: CAARs of target firms by status of bid  
Time Interval  Merger  t-value 
Friendly 
acquisition  t-value  Hostile acquisition  t-value 
Multiple 
Bidders  t-value 
Event Window  %    %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  8.80  19.00
***  5.96  6.34
***  12.60  22.81
***  6.98  8.62
*** 
[-2, +2]  12.62  17.24
***  11.33  7.62
***  17.95  20.54
***  11.28  8.82
*** 
[-40, 0]  23.41  6.04
***  20.34  5.41
***  29.23  6.79
***  23.68  2.87
*** 
[-60, +60]  23.59  6.55
***  26.52  3.62
**  28.36  6.60
***  20.53  3.26
*** 
Observations  40 
  53    28 
  14 
 
 

























Event Window  %    %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  3.81  7.59
***  6.64  10.40
***  5.63  8.67
***  2.83  5.16
*** 
[-2, +2]  5.33  6.72
***  6.62  6.56
***  6.67  6.49
***  1.29  1.48 
[-40, 0]  5.82  3.59
***  8.89  3.78
***  5.55  3.51
***  3.07  1.68 
[-60, +60]  4.77  1.22  1.85  0.37  7.84  1.55  -2.92  0.68 
 
Panel C: CAARs of bidding firms by status of bid  
Time Interval  Merger  t-value 
Friendly 
acquisition  t-value 
Hostile 
acquisition  t-value 
Multiple 
Bidders  t-value 
Event day  %    %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  2.20  5.22
***  2.43  5.06
***  -2.51  -5.61
***  -0.08  -0.13 
[-2, +2]  4.35  6.55
***  1.94  2.56
***  -3.43  -4.85
***  0.85  0.81 
[-40, 0]  4.63  2.95
***  4.86  2.45
***  -2.51  -1.56  -1.04  -0.59 
[-60, +60]  3.03  0.93  -1.67  -0.45  -0.69  -0.20  -2.96  -0.58 
Observations  41 
  55    32 
  17 
 
 

























Event Window  %    %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  -4.71  -10.89
***  -4.94  -10.62
***  -2.43  -4.59
***  -0.23  0.51 
[-2, +2]  -7.78  -11.38
***  -5.37  -7.31
***  -4.28  -5.11
***  2.41  3.39
*** 
[-40, 0]  -7.14  -5.66
***  -7.37  -3.14
***  -1.47  -1.28  -0.23  -0.31 
[-60, +60]  -3.72  -1.10  -0.99  -0.27  2.28  0.55  4.70  1.35 
 Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   37 
   
Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms: UK versus 
Continental Europe. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
location (UK versus Continental Europe). ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
Panel A: CAARs of Target Firms: UK versus Continental Europe 
Time Interval 
 
UK  t-value 
Continental 





Event window  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  12.31  29.09
***  5.95  13.99
***  6.35  14.96
*** 
[-2, +2]  17.42  26.03
***  8.85  13.15
***  8.56  12.75
*** 
[-40, 0]  38.30  14.66
***  14.95  7.56
***  23.35  5.64
*** 
[-60, +60]  29.32  8.91
***  14.82  4.48
***  14.49  4.39
*** 
Observations  70    66       
Panel B: CAARs of Bidding Firms: UK versus Continental Europe 
Time Interval  UK  t-value 
Continental 





Event window  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  1.04  3.41
***  0.40  1.19  0.64  1.98
* 
[-2, +2]  1.51  3.11
***  0.90  1.69
*  0.60  1.17 
[-40, 0]  1.19  0.92  0.35  0.22  0.84  0.68 
[-60, +60]  -1.65  -0.69  0.54  0.21  -2.193  -0.87 
Observations  66    76       
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Table 7: Cumulative abnormal returns of domestic and cross-border bids. 
This table shows the percentage abnormal returns for different event windows for listed target and bidder firms of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The number of deals refers to the number of takeover announcements. 
***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own 
calculations. 
 
    Domestic M&A  Cross-border M&A 
    Number  Listed Target  Listed Bidder  Number  Listed Target  Listed Bidder 
     Of Deals  %  t-stat  %  t-stat  Of Deals  %  t-stat  %  t-stat 
All Countries  Obs.:118  Obs.:85    Obs.:86    Obs.:69  Obs.:49    Obs.: 56   
  [-1,0]    10.22  28.776
***  -0.45  -1.604    11.25  23.247
***  2.38  6.389
*** 
  [-2,+2]    12.72  22.645
***  -0.10  -0.222    13.51  17.656
***  3.09  5.247
*** 
  [-40, 0]    22.74  14.139
***  -0.57  -0.446    19.81  9.044
***  1.48  0.880 
  [-60, +60]    22.87  8.277
***  -0.53  -0.242    19.49  5.178
***  -0.41  -0.142 
UK+Ireland  Obs.:74  Obs.: 56    Obs.:52    Obs.:19  Obs.:14    Obs.:14   
  [-1,0]    12.89  30.559
***  -1.27  -3.979
***    15.27  16.196
***  6.29  7.793
*** 
  [-2,+2]    15.68  23.508
***  -0.60  -1.190    17.61  11.811
***  9.17  7.185
*** 
  [-40, 0]    26.99  14.135
***  -1.28  -0.884    31.24  7.317
***  4.91  1.344 
  [-60, +60]    27.78  8.468
***  -2.20  -0.885    33.28  4.537
***  0.34  0.054 
Germany/Aust./Switz  Obs.:7  Obs.: 6    Obs.:4    Obs.:18  Obs.: 12    Obs.:12   
  [-1,0]    6.77  5.092
***  3.76  3.114
***    10.72  9.110
***  0.31  0.515 
  [-2,+2]    7.21  3.430
***  1.98  1.038    13.39  7.199
***  -1.93  -1.580 
  [-40, 0]    14.53  2.412
***  -2.00  -0.365    13.70  2.573
***  -1.85  -0.479 
  [-60, +60]    -0.59  -0.057  -8.95  -0.952    8.11  0.887  -5.99  -0.893 
France  Obs.:16  Obs.:11    Obs.:13    Obs.: 7  Obs.:3    Obs.:13   
  [-1,0]    3.58  3.976
***  -1.72  -2.105
**    5.90  4.498
***  0.98  1.623 
  [-2,+2]    4.29  3.013
***  -1.91  -1.478    9.60  4.628
***  2.83  2.093
** 
  [-40, 0]    11.81  2.895
***  -1.39  -0.375    8.35  1.406  -0.85  -0.220 
  [-60, +60]    17.15  2.446
***  3.23  0.508    8.34  0.817  12.68  1.904
* 
Scandinavia  Obs.:3  Obs.:1    Obs.:3    Obs.:13  Obs.:11    Obs.: 5   
  [-1,0]    1.23  0.354  0.53  0.265    11.33  8.881
***  1.47  1.303 
  [-2,+2]    -0.36  -0.066  2.02  0.637    11.10  5.505
***  -1.33  -0.527 
  [-40, 0]    38.84  2.466
***  5.83  0.644    19.30  3.340
***  0.76  0.105 
  [-60, +60]    27.78  1.027  11.87  0.763    16.96  1.708
*  -11.31  -0.909 
Benelux  Obs.:6  Obs.: 4    Obs.:4    Obs.:8  Obs.:7    Obs.:8   
  [-1,0]    13.79  6.158
***  6.45  5.523
***    10.98  8.519
***  2.40  2.429
*** 
  [-2,+2]    13.96  3.943
***  9.59  5.197
***    17.73  8.700
***  2.19  1.569 
  [-40, 0]    22.42  2.211
**  4.64  0.878    16.98  2.910
***  0.80  0.178 
  [-60, +60]    20.81  1.195  4.88  0.537    10.98  1.095  -7.20  -0.938 
Southern Europe  Obs.:10  Obs.:7    Obs.:8    Obs.:4  Obs.:2    Obs.:4   
  [-1,0]    2.31  2.011
**  -0.09  -0.067    8.07  3.257
***  1.29  1.559 
  [-2,+2]    7.78  4.281
***  -0.85  -0.404    8.17  2.085
**  5.52  2.978
*** 
  [-40, 0]    6.20  1.192  -0.61  -0.101    20.01  1.784
*  13.23  2.493
*** 
  [-60, +60]    1.85  0.207  -3.84  -0.371    10.50  0.545  5.22  0.573 
Central Europe  Obs.:2  Obs.:0    Obs.:2    Obs.:0  Obs.:0    Obs.:0   
  [-1,0]    NA    -0.92  -0.303    NA    NA   
  [-2,+2]        -0.08  -0.017           
  [-40, 0]        -8.23  -0.597           
  [-60, +60]        11.99  0.507           Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   39 
   
Table 8: Cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms by means of 
payment 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
means of payment (all-cash, all-equity or a combination of cash, equity and/or loan notes). ***, ** and * stand 
for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
Panel A: CAARs of target firms by means of payment     
Time Interval  Cash bid  t-value  Equity bid  t-value  Combined bid  t-value 
[-1, 0]  9.89  35.81
***  6.65  16.07
***  5.63  11.68
*** 
[-2, +2]  13.56  21.95
***  11.38  12.30
***  13.24  12.28
*** 
[-40, 0]  27.49  15.54
***  12.23  4.62
***  16.81  5.44
*** 
[-60, +60]  28.75  9.46
***  12.89  2.83
***  5.66  1.07 
Observations  88    30    18   
Panel B: Significance of differences in target CAARs among types of payment 
  














Event Window  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  3.24  36.10
***  4.26  30.81
***  1.01  0.20 
[-2, +2]  2.18  10.84
***  0.32  1.02  -1.86  -0.24 
[-40, 0]  15.26  26.52
***  10.68  12.07
***  -4.58  -0.35 
[-60, +60]  15.86  16.04
***  23.09  15.19
***  7.23  0.43 
Panel C: CAARs of bidding firms by means of payment    
Time Interval  Cash bid  t-value  Equity bid  t-value 
Cash/equity/ 
loan notes bid  t-value 
Event day  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  0.37  1.68
*  0.98  3.01
***  0.13  0.35 
[-2, +2]  0.90  1.83
*  2.57  3.52
***  0.22  0.27 
[-40, 0]  -1.18  -0.84  5.15  2.46
**  -0.20  -0.09 
[-60, +60]  -1.44  -0.59  2.72  0.76  -1.39  -0.34 
Observations  86    33    23   
















Event Window  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  -0.61  -9.95
***  0.24  2.97
***  0.85  8.93
*** 
[-2, +2]  -1.67  -12.08
***  0.68  3.79
***  2.35  11.00
*** 
[-40, 0]  -6.33  -16.01
***  -0.98  -1.89
*  5.36  8.75
*** 
[-60, +60]  -4.16  -6.11
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Table 9:  Cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms by industry. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
industry. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: 
own calculations. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Target Firms by Industry 
Time Interval  Energy  t-value  Manufac.  t-value  Services  t-value  Retailer  t-value  Bank  t-value 
Event day  %    %    %    %    %   
.[-1, 0]  5.06  4.57
***  10.87  25.77
***  7.34  10.48
***  14.35  17.99
***  4.03  5.48
*** 
[-2, +2]  6.83  3.90
***  15.16  22.73
***  10.50  9.48
***  16.87  13.38
***  10.06  8.63
*** 
[-40, 0]  17.28  3.99
***  26.53  15.34
***  25.22  6.04
***  17.31  10.04
***  18.31  7.39
*** 
[-60, +60]  21.30  2.78
**  24.86  7.58
***  27.10  4.98
***  18.22  2.94
**  8.83  1.54 
Observations  9    49    36    23    19   
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidding Firms by Industry 
Time Interval  Energy  t-value  Manufac.  t-value  Services  t-value  Retailers  t-value  Bank  t-value 
Event day  %    %    %    %    %   
.[-1, 0]  -1.91  -1.98
*  1.89  5.00
***  -2.35  -4.43
***  2.07  3.94
***  0.44  0.75 
[-2, +2]  -0.83  -0.54  2.92  4.88
***  -2.19  -2.61
**  2.19  2.64
**  -0.15  -0.16 
[-40, 0]  -4.83  -1.46  0.12  0.11  -1.56  -1.73
*  5.13  1.78
*  -1.85  -0.99 
[-60, +60]  7.64  1.02  -1.66  -0.56  2.90  0.70  5.37  1.32  -8.95  -1.96
* 
Observations  9    63    28    20    22   Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   41 
   
 Table 10: Cumulative abnormal returns of target and bidding firms by ultimately 
successful and failed bids. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
outcome of the negotiations (failure versus success). ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
Panel A: CAARs of Target Firms by Ultimate Success or Failure of the Bid 
Time Interval  Failures  t-value  Successes  t-value 




Event date  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  5.51  8.49
***  10.30  27.84
***  -4.79  -10.36
*** 
[-2, +2]  10.83  10.55
***  13.75  23.51
***  -2.92  -3.99
*** 
[-40, 0]  29.11  8.73
***  22.45  11.73
***  6.66  5.13
*** 
[-60, +60]  25.02  4.95
***  20.58  7.15
***  4.44  1.23 
Observations  27    109       
Panel B: CAARs of Bidding Firms by Ultimate Success or Failure of the Bid 





Event date  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  -0.73  -1.45  1.08  4.05
***  -1.81  -5.48
*** 
[-2, +2]  -0.97  -1.22  1.75  4.16
***  -2.72  -5.21
*** 
[-40, 0]  -0.03  -0.04  0.67  1.56  -0.70  -1.66
* 
[-60, +60]  1.96  0.50  -1.13  -0.54  3.09  1.20 
Observations  29    113       
 
 Table 11: Cumulative abnormal returns by year of bid. 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for target firms and bidder firms by 
year of bid (prior to 1999 and 1999/2000). ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
Panel A: CAARs of Target Firms by Year of Bid 






  %    %    %   
Event day             
[-1, 0]  08.80  23.30
***  09.20  18.90
***  0.40  0.92 
[-2,+2]  14.02  23.48
***  11.99  15.58
***  -2.03  -2.93
*** 
[-40, 0]  21.78  8.52
***  24.15  9.34
***  2.37  1.31 
[-60, +60]  18.47  6.29
***  24.83  6.56
***  6.36  1.87
* 
Observations  65    71       
Panel B: CAARs of Bidding Firms by Year of Bid 






  %    %    %   
[-1, 0]  0.55  2.13
**  0.87  2.17
**  0.32  0.96 
[-2, +2]  1.22  2.98
***  1.14  1.80
*  -0.08  -0.16 
[-40, 0]  1.72  1.59  0.07  0.10  -1.65  1.60 
[-60, +60]  -0.10  -0.05  -0.91  -0.29  -0.81  -0.31 
Observations  74    68       Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   42 
   
Table 12: Cumulative abnormal returns of divesting firms 
This table shows cumulative abnormal returns over several event windows for divesting firms. ***, ** and * 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
Time Interval  CAAR   t-value 
Event day  %   
[-1, 0]  0.31  0.51 
[-2, +2]  3.46  3.60
*** 
[-40, 0]     
[-60, +60]  1.03  0.22 
Observations  29   
 
Table 13: Correlations between target, bidder and total wealth gain. 
This table tests whether or not bids were made for reasons of synergy, agency or hubris. Source: own calculations.  
 
Panel A: Expected sign of correlation 
  Expected sign Correlation 
Target and Total Gain 
Expected sign Correlation 
Target and Bidder Gain 
Synergy  Positive  Positive 
Agency   Negative  Negative 
Hubris  Zero  Negative 
Panel B: Correlations between target, bidder and total event day gain  
  Correlation Target and 
Total Gain 
Correlation Target and  
Bidder Gain 
Total sample (64 observations)  0.4545
**  0.0617 
Positive total gain sub-sample (42)  0.2474
*  -0.1990 
Negative total gain sub-sample (22)  0.2359  -0.1267 
Panel C: Correlations between target, bidder and total gain over period [-10, 0] 
  Correlation Target and 
Total Gain 
Correlation Target and  
Bidder Gain 
Total sample (64)  0.6330
***  0.4155
** 
Positive total gain sub-sample (42)  0.5541
**  0.1763
* 
Negative total gain sub-sample (22)  0.1393  -0.1640
* 
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Table 14: Determinants of short-term wealth effects for target and bidding firms. 
This table shows OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over different event windows for target and 
bidder firms. Hostile acquisition is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target’s board opposes the acquisition or 
when there are multiple bidders. A friendly acquisition is accepted by the target’s board and is not a merger (as 
indicated by the M&A Report). The variable cash payment is 1 when the bid is made in cash only. The relative 
size is total assets of target divided by total assets of the bidder. ROE stands for return on equity. Bidder 
diversification is a dummy variable capturing whether the bidder is diversified (dummy=1) or is a single-industry 
company. Bidder and target are in the same industry indicates whether the M&A is the result of a focus strategy 
(dummy equal to 1). Domestic M&A is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the target and the bidder are in 
the same country. UK target, German/Central European target, and Southern European target are dummy variables 
capture whether the target firm is located in, respectively, the UK, Germany/Austria/Switzerland/Poland, and 
Italy/Spain/Portugal/Greece. The benchmark is France/Benelux. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Source: own calculations. 
 
  Target firms  Bidder firms 
Dep variable  CAAR [-1, 0]  CAAR [-10, 0]  CAAR [-1, 0]  CAAR [-1, 0] 
  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept  0.0510  2.311
**  0.0715  2.877
***  0.0588  2.371
***  0.0687  2.466
*** 
   Bid characteristics                 
hostile acquisition  0.0235  2.006
**  0.0731  2.239
**  -0.0573  -2.737
***  -0.0663  -2.637
*** 
Friendly acquisition  -0.0177  -1.787
*  -0.0141  1.777
*   0.0266  0.456  0.0101  0.460 
cash payment  0.0748  2.152
**  0.0699  2.515
***  -0.0332  -1.858
*  -0.018  -1.572 
  Bidder and target characteristics               
Relative size (target/bidder)  0.0014  0.220  0.0018  0.469  0.0054  0.673  0.0015  0.563 
Target cash reserves/Market cap.  -0.0534  -1.005  0.0290  0.284  0.0011  0.738  0.0008  0.351 
Target market-to-book ratio  0.0016  1.789
*  0.0020  1.911
*  -0.0021  -2.595
***  -0.0029  1.728
* 
Target ROE  0.0333  1.687
*  0.0518  1.566  -0.0156  -1.004  0.0064  0.452 
Interest coverage  -0.0091  -1.214  -0.0061  -0.673  0.0014  0.490  0.0015  0.631 
Bidder diversification  0.0694  0.583  0.0135  0.241  -0.0096  -1.721
*  -0.0088  -1.689
* 
Bidder and target:same industry  -0.0572  -1.444  -0.1005  -1.351  0.252  1.461  0.374  0.637 
   M&A location                 
Domestic M&A  0.0251  1.602  0.0114  1.742
*  -0.0074  -1.688
*  -0.0014  -0.863 
UK target  0.0712  2.355
***  0.0961  2.532
***  0.0327  1.956
*  0.0332  1.819
* 
German/Central European target  0.0199  2.005
**  0.0138  1.798
*  0.0210  2.636
***  0.0056  1.647 
Southern European target  0.0089  1.864
*  0.0067  1.372  0.0069  1.254  0.0007  1.035 
   Industries                 
Energy  -0.0370  -0.229  -0.1051  -0.674  -0.0324  -0.684  -0.0943  -0.634 
Services  -0.8529  -0.738  -0.0467  -0.663  -0.2511  -1.221  -0.6866  -0.013 
Retail  -0.5628  -0.330  0.0998  0.421  0.0999  0.997  0.0142  0.852 
Financial  0.1411  0.454  0.3145  1.271  -0.4126  -0.637  -0.0853  -0.462 
Observations  136    136    142    142   
R
2  0.304    0.350    0.331    0.379   
Adjusted R
2  0.152    0.215    0.223    0.246   
Signif. of F-value  0.009    0.003    0.001    0.001   
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Appendix:  Distribution of different types of betas 
This table shows distributional information about the betas estimated using 6 different techniques for the sample 
firms. The results for the subsamples of 142 bidding firms, 136 target firms and 29 divesting firms are presented 
separately. (1) indicates that the data are trimmed at the 5% and 95% level, (2) stands for untrimmed data. MM [-
15, 6] and MM  [-10, -1] stand for the beta measured using the market model over, respectively, the periods 15 to 6 
months and 10 and 1 months prior to the event date. ML is the beta with the Merrill Lynch regression to the mean. 
The Vasicek and Dimson betas respectively correct for the regression to the mean effect and thin trading. The 
Datastream beta is collected from that database.  




















MM [-15. -6]  0.852  0.126  0.456  0.901  1.199  1.980  0.426  0.413  0.489 
MM  [-10. -1]  0.839  0.211  0.543  0.936  1.193  1.852  0.412  0.328  -0.407 
ML beta  0.929  0.211  0.769  0.994  1.231  1.852  0.286  0.404  0.431 
Vasicek beta  0.955  0.245  0.654  0.997  1.193  1.963  0.389  0.101  0.124 
Dimson beta  0.940  0.115  0.577  0.953  1.019  1.934  0.543  0.079  0.655 
Datastream beta  0.916  0.124  0.730  0.945  1.120  1.940  0.415  -0.447  0.407 




















MM [-15. -6]  0.864  0.164  0.568  0.894  1.050  1.652  0.394  -0.124  -0.344 
MM  [-10. -1]  0.825  0.234  0.599  0.973  1.036  1.765  0.392  0.140  -0.566 
ML beta  0.939  0.157  0.744  0.963  1.033  1.600  0.265  -0.129  -0.373 
Vasicek beta  0.956  0.245  0.754  0.986  1.214  1.769  0.319  0.201  -0.210 
Dimson beta  0.989  0.115  0.654  0.998  1.154  1.923  0.507  0.150  0.177 
Datastream beta  0.936  0.207  0.710  0.989  1.190  1.780  0.333  0.383  -0.013 




















MM [-15. -6]  0.861  0.126  0.463  0.978  1.213  1.728  0.449  0.650  -0.058 
MM  [-10. -1]  0.874  0.211  0.568  0.976  1.188  1.767  0.453  0.648  -0.207 
ML beta  0.933  0.243  0.695  0.923  1.142  1.698  0.302  0.653  -0.077 
Vasicek beta  0.963  0.278  0.657  1.024  1.256  1.863  0.347  0.231  0.341 
Dimson beta  0.889  0.231  0.530  0.892  1.241  1.934  0.609  0.141  0.742 
Datastream beta  0.909  0.124  0.655  0.899  1.294  1.940  0.502  -0.166  0.422 




















MM [-15. -6]  0.765  0.304  0.396  0.868  1.181  1.980  0.445  0.220  0.238 
MM  [-10. -1]  0.784  0.367  0.426  0.898  1.178  1.852  0.279  -0.165  -0.267 
ML beta  0.867  0.351  0.598  0.912  1.187  1.789  0.297  0.220  0.338 
Vasicek beta  0.921  0.378  0.651  0.976  1.238  1.963  0.267  0.021  0.312 
Dimson beta  0.881  0.324  0.500  0.899  1.193  1.678  0.389  0.330  0.165 
Datastream beta  0.846  0.324  0.580  1.003  1.216  1.578  0.390  0.155  0.469 
Source: own calculations using Datastream data.  Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and cross-border takeover bids                   45 
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